The Coase Proposition, Information Constraints, and Long Run Equilibrium:  Comment by Hansmann, Henry
 The Coase Proposition, Information Constraints,
 and Long-Run Equilibrium: Comment
 By HENRY B. HANSMANN*
 In a recent paper in this Review, William
 Schulze and Ralph d'Arge employ a partial
 equilibrium model of two competitive in-
 dustries with an externality to analyze the
 well-known "Coase proposition." In par-
 ticular, they compare both the short-run
 and long-run efficiency implications of (a)
 the unadjusted externality case, (b) a Pigo-
 vian tax on the output of the firms generat-
 ing the external cost (the "emitting" firms),
 (c) a rule making the emitting firms liable to
 the "receptor" firms, and (d) a situation in
 which the emitting firms incur no liability,
 but firms in the two industries are free to
 bargain costlessly concerning the externality.
 The analysis in general is illuminating.
 However, their conclusions regarding the
 impact of a liability rule, both in the short
 run and in the long run, appear to be in er-
 ror. This is of particular significance be-
 cause, as the authors point out, it is pre-
 cisely the impact of a liability rule that has
 been at the center of the controversy over
 the Coase proposition.
 1. The Short Run
 According to Schulze and d'Arge, in the
 short run a liability rule will lead to the
 optimum level of output in both industries.
 Under the assumptions they make, however,
 the liability rule will in fact lead to higher
 production in the emitting industry than is
 socially optimal. The error lies in the deriva-
 tion of their equation (8), which gives the
 condition for profit maximization in the
 emitting industry. To see the mistake, it is
 helpful to rewrite the second equation in
 their equations (6), which shows the profit
 for a representative firm in the emitting in-
 dustry, and from which (8) is derived, as
 (1) r2 = P2Y2 - C2(Y2)- n-D,(Q2)ln2
 where Y2 is the output of a representative
 firm inthe emitting industry, Q2 is the total
 output of the n2 firms in the emitting in-
 dustry, C2 is the direct cost of producing
 Y2, and D,(Q2) is the cost to each of the n,
 firms in the receptor industry of the ex-
 ternality associated with production level
 Q2 in the emitting industry. (This formula-
 tion follows the authors in assuming that
 the amount paid to the receptor industry is
 divided up equally among the emitting
 firms.)' The first-order condition for profit
 maximization is then
 (2) 87r2/aYl2=
 P2 - C' - nD'LIdY] =0
 This is the same as their equation (8), ex-
 cept that they assume that dQ2/dy2 = n2,
 and thus that the term in brackets equals
 unity. That is, their formulation assumes
 that each firm expects that if it increases
 output by one unit, so will all other firms in
 the industry, and total industry output will
 therefore increase by n2 units. Since they
 explicitly assume that the emitting industry
 is competitive, however, a firm in that in-
 dustry would behave as if dQ2/dy2 = 1, or,
 in other words, as if its decisions had no ef-
 fect on the behavior of other firms. Thus,
 we can rewrite (2) as
 *Assistant professor of law, University of Pennsyl-
 vania. I wish to thank William Brainard for valuable
 comments.
 lAlternatively, we could assume that liability is
 divided up among emitting firms according to their
 output, so that equation (1) instead appears as
 2 = P2Y2- C2(Y2) - n ID ,(Q2)Y2/Q2
 However, so long as n2 is large and, as the authors as-
 sume, D" > 0 (so that marginal damages exceed aver-
 age damages), short-run output in the emitting in-
 dustry under a liability rule will still exceed the social
 optimum.
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 (2') aw2/Y2 = P2 - C' - nD,/n2 = 0
 This condition will be met for individual
 firms only when their output-and that for
 the industry as a whole-exceeds the level
 corresponding to a social optimum. Indeed,
 if n2 is large the short-run equilibrium for
 the emitting industry will be quite close to
 that in the unadjusted externality case, in
 which firms in the emitting industry ignore
 the impact of the externality altogether. In
 large part, then, the effect of Schulze and
 d'Arge's liability rule is not to force internali-
 zation of the external costs engendered by
 an emitting firm, but rather simply to shift
 the burden of those costs away from the
 firms in the receptor industry and onto the
 other firms in the emitting industry.
 II. The Long Run
 In the long run, the authors assert the
 liability rule results in an overallocation of
 resources to both industries. Their conclu-
 sion is correct so far as the receptor in-
 dustry is concerned. In the emitting industry,
 however, the effect of a liability rule might
 well be underproduction rather than over-
 production.
 Schulze and d'Arge's argument is based
 upon their Figure 2. They correctly note
 that in long-run equilibrium a representa-
 tive firm in the emitting industry will
 operate along an average cost curve given
 by A C2 = C2/Y2 + n 1 D 1/n2y2. They argue
 that this average cost curve will always lie
 below the curve corresponding to the opti-
 mal Pigovian tax because, under their as-
 sumptions, average damages (upon which
 liability payments are based) are always be-
 low marginal damages (upon which the
 optimal tax is based). Therefore, they reason,
 under a liability rule price will be set too
 low in the emitting industry, and total out-
 put will be too high. Yet, as noted above,
 they are incorrect in stating that the margi-
 nal cost curve perceived by an individual
 firm is given by C' + n,D' rather than by
 CQ + nD1D/n2. Consequently, with a lia-
 bility rule firms should be expected to pro-
 duce at an output level exceeding that which
 corresponds to the lowest point on the long-
 run average cost curve. Thus simply ob-
 serving that the minimum on one average
 cost curve lies below the minimum on the
 other does not suffice to establish their con-
 clusion.
 But more remarkably, while Schulze and
 d'Arge correctly note that a liability rule
 will induce entry of firms into the receptor
 industry beyond the social optimum, they
 ignore the fact that this increase in n1 will
 tend to raise both marginal and average
 cost in the emitting industry by increasing
 the amount of damages that must be paid.
 Similarly, they appear to ignore the effect of
 changes in the number of firms in the emit-
 ting industry, n2, upon the position of the
 marginal and average cost curves both di-
 rectly and via the terms D1 and D', both of
 which depend on n2
 When all of these factors are accounted
 for, it is clear that the long-run equilibrium
 price in the emitting industry could as well
 be above as below the social optimum, and
 thus that there could as well be too little as
 too much production in that industry.
 In fact, one would expect underpro-
 duction to be the typical result. Only if
 marginal damages exceed average damages
 by a substantial amount, and demand in the
 receptor industry is quite price inelastic (so
 that the reduction in cost and price resulting
 from receipt of compensation would cause
 little expansion in that industry, and thus
 little increase in the liability of the emitting
 firms), would one expect to find overpro-
 duction in the emitting industry under a
 liability rule.
 These points can be illustrated with a
 simple example. Assume that the cost func-
 tions for the two industries are given by
 Ci = (yi - 100)3 + 1003 i = 1,2
 D I = (n2y2)2/75
 and that the demand curves for the products
 of the two industries are given by
 Pi = 30,000 - niyi/2 i = 1,2
 These functions give the conventional U-
 shaped average cost curves for both in-
 dustries, and satisfy as well all of the other
 conditions set out by Schulze and d'Arge.
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 The conditions for a social optimum are
 those given by the authors as (their equa-
 tions (2)-(5)):
 (3) PI = Cl
 (4) P2 = C + nID'
 (5) Ply, = Cl + D
 (6) P2y2 = C2 + n1y2D'
 Using the specific cost and demand func-
 tions just given, these four equations can be
 solved (by means of substitution and itera-
 tive estimation) for the four unknowns,
 yielding the (rounded) values2 n1 = 34.6,
 n2= 105,yI= 194,andy2= iSO.Theopti-
 mal total output of the emitting industry is
 therefore n2Y2 = 15,750.
 With a liability rule, the long-run equi-
 librium will be characterized by the four
 equations
 (3') P = Cl
 (2') P2 = C'2 + n1D'/n2
 (5') Ply, = Cl
 (6') P2y2 = C2 + n1D1/n2
 which are the same as those given by the
 authors except for (2'), which is discussed
 above. Substituting the specific functional
 forms assumed here, these equations can
 again be solved for the four unknowns
 givingnI = 300, n2 = 23.7, yI = 150, and
 Y2 = 193. Thus, with a liability rule, the
 total output of the emitting industry is
 n2y2 = 4,581. Rather than being greater
 than the optimum output for the emitting
 industry, as Schulze and d'Arge predict,
 this is in fact less than one-third of the
 optimum output as calculated above.
 2The figures given here and in the liability rule case
 below suggest that firms in each industry are divisible.
 Only minor adjustments in the figures are necessary if
 an integral number of firms is required.
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